Tijs et al (2006) [23] introduce the family of obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. We give a generalization of such family. We prove that our family coincides with the set of rules satisfying an additivity property and a cost monotonicity property. We also provide two new characterizations for the family of obligation rules using the previous properties. In the first one we add a property of separability; and in the second one we add core selection.
Introduction
A group of agents demands specific services which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost and they do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. These situations are studied in the literature on "minimum cost spanning tree problems". Formally, a minimum cost spanning tree problem is characterized by a set N ∪ {0} and a matrix C. N is the set of agents, 0 is the source, and for each i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}, c ij denotes the cost of connecting i and j. Many real situations can be modeled in this way. For instance communication networks, such as telephone, internet, wireless telecommunication, or cable television.
Initially, the objective is to minimize the cost of connecting all agents to the source. This is achieved by a network of links that has no cycles, which is called a "minimal tree". Kruskal (1956) [15] and Prim (1957) [21] designed two algorithms for obtaining a minimal tree. Once such a tree is obtained, its associated cost has to be divided among the agents. Some authors propose a single rule for dividing the cost. See, for instance, Bird (1976) [9] , Feltkamp et al (1994) [13] , Kar (2002) [17] , and Dutta and Kar (2004) [11] .
Other authors have studied a family of rules instead of focusing on a single rule. In general, each family of rules depends on a family of parameters that model relevant aspects of the minimum cost spanning tree problem which do not appear in the cost matrix. This freedom allows a planner to choose the rule of the family which best fits a particular problem, which the planner is trying to solve. For instance, Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b) [4] [5] introduce the family of optimistic weighted Shapley rules. Each rule in the family is a weighted Shapley value of the so called optimistic game (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) [7] ). Thus, each rule depends on a vector of weights (w i ) i∈N in such a way that, the larger the weight of an agent is, the more the agent pays. Suppose that the source is a dam which provides water for people in a valley, as in Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2008) [2] . Since there are farmers and householders in the valley, agents achieve different benefits from water supply reliability. We take this aspect into account by using an optimistic weighted Shapley rule, where w i represents the benefits that agent i obtains from the supply of water.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems and the notation used in the paper.
Let N ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite subset N ⊂ N , an order π on N is a bijection π : N −→ {1, . . . , |N |} where, for each i ∈ N , π (i) is the position of agent i. Let Π N denote the set of all orders on N .
For each S ⊂ N , let ∆(S) = x ∈ R S + :
Usually, we consider N = {1, . . . , |N |} as the set of agents and 0 as a special element called the source. We denote N 0 = N ∪ {0} .
A cost matrix C = (c ij ) i,j∈N0 gives the cost of a direct link between any two nodes. We assume symmetric costs, i.e., for each i, j ∈ N 0 , c ij = c ji ≥ 0 and for each i ∈ N 0 , c ii = 0.
We denote the set of all cost matrices with agent set N by C N . Given C, C ∈ C N we say that
A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly referred to as an mcstp, is a pair (N 0 , C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ C N is a cost matrix. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction of the mcstp to S 0 = S ∪ {0} by (S 0 , C). A network g over N 0 is a subset of {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N 0 , i = j}. The elements of g are called arcs. Since we assume symmetric costs, we work with undirected arcs, i.e., (i, j) = (j, i).
Given a network g and a pair of distinct nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is a sequence of distinct arcs g ij = {(i s−1 , i s )} p s=1 that satisfy (i s−1 , i s ) ∈ g for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i 0 and j = i p . A cycle is a path from i to i different from (i, i). Given i, j ∈ N 0 , we say that i, and j are connected in g if there exists a path from i to j.
A tree is a network such that for each i ∈ N, there is a unique path from i to the source. We denote the set of all networks over N 0 by G N and the set of networks over N 0 in such a way that every agent in N is connected to the source by G N 0 . Given a network g, let P (g) = {S k (g)} n(g) k=1 denote the partition of N 0 in connected components induced by g. Formally, P (g) is the only partition of N 0 satisfying these two properties:
• If i, j ∈ S k (g), then i and j are connected in g.
• If i ∈ S k (g), j ∈ S l (g) and k = l, then i and j are not connected in g.
Given a network g and i ∈ N 0 , let S(P (g), i) denote the element of P (g) to which i belongs to. Norde et al (2004) [20] prove that every mcstp can be written as a non-negative combination of mcstp in which the costs of the arcs are 0 or 1. The next lemma states, using our notation, this result in a slightly different but equivalent way.
Lemma 0. For each mcstp (N 0 , C), there exists a family
q=1 of cost matrices and a family
q=1 of non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)}, there exists a network g q such that c
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and g ∈ G N , we define the cost associated with g as
When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N 0 , C, g). A minimal tree for (N 0 , C), briefly referred to as an mt, is a tree t ∈ G N 0 such that c(t) = min
An mt always exists, although it may not be unique. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), m(N 0 , C) denotes the cost of any mt t in (N 0 , C).
After obtaining an mt, one of the most important issues addressed in the literature on mcstp is how to divide its cost m(N 0 , C) among the agents. A cost allocation rule is a map f that associates with each mcstp
Kruskal (1956) [15] defines an algorithm for constructing an mt. The idea is quite simple, the mt is constructed by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest cost without introducing cycles. Formally, Kruskal's algorithm is defined as follows.
We start with A 0 (C) = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N 0 , i = j} and g 0 (C) = ∅.
{c kl } . If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. We have that
Stage p + 1. We have defined the sets A p (C) and
{c kl } . If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. Two cases are possible:
} has a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p + 1 with
This process is completed in |N | stages. We say that g |N | (C) is a tree obtained following Kruskal's algorithm. Note that this algorithm leads to a tree, but this is not always unique.
When there is no ambiguity, we write A p , g p , and
Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] define a family of rules through Kruskal's algorithm. At each step of the algorithm, an arc is added to the network. Once we add the arc, we divide its cost among the agents. Let be a function specifying the part of the cost paid by each agent. Each agent will pay the sum of the costs paid in each arc selected by Kruskal's algorithm.
Let P (N 0 ) denote the set of all partitions over N 0 . Let P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } be a generic element of P (N 0 ) such that 0 ∈ S 0 . Given P, P ∈ P (N 0 ) we say that P is finer than P if for each S ∈ P , there exists T ∈ P such that S ⊂ T . Given P, P ∈ P (N 0 ) we say that P is 1-finer than P if P is obtained joining two elements of P. Namely, if P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } and P is 1-finer than P then,
A sharing function is a function associating with each pair of partitions (P, P ) where P is 1-finer than P , a vector (P, P ) ∈ ∆ (N ) satisfying the following path independence condition.
Let P , P ∈ P (N 0 ) be such that P is finer than P . Assume that P We can associate with each sharing function the rule f in mcstp defined as follows. For each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each i ∈ N, we define
Since Kruskal's algorithm can produce several trees, f could depend on the tree g |N | selected. Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] prove that this is not the case. Thus, f is well defined for each sharing function .
Generalized obligation rules
Tijs et al (2006) [23] introduce obligation rules for mcstp through obligation functions. For each obligation function o we can associate an obligation rule f o . We define generalized obligation functions. Applying the same ideas as in Tijs et al (2006) [23] , for each generalized obligation function θ, we define the rule f θ . The main result of this section says that the set of rules associated with generalized obligation functions coincides with the set of rules associated with sharing functions introduced in Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] . Tijs et al (2006) [23] define obligation rules through a matrix called the contribution matrix. They also mention that obligation rules can be obtained through Kruskal's algorithm. We present the definition of obligation rules through Kruskal's algorithm in order to adapt it to this paper.
Given N ⊂ N , an obligation function for N is a map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} a vector o(S) ∈ R S satisfying the following conditions. For each
We can associate an obligation rule f o with each obligation function o as follows. At each stage of Kruskal's algorithm an arc (i p , j p ) is added to the network. The cost of this arc will be paid by the agents who benefit from its construction. We compute the amount paid by each agent using the obligation function.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and i ∈ N ,
where (i p , j p ) and g p are obtained through Kruskal's algorithm. Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that f o is an allocation rule in mcstp, i.e., it does not depend on the mt chosen by Kruskal's algorithm.
We define a generalized obligation function as a map θ : P (N 0 ) → R N satisfying three conditions for each P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m }:
We first prove that obligation functions can be considered as a subset of generalized obligation functions. Given an obligation function o, P ∈ P (N ), and i ∈ S ∈ P, we define
Proposition 1. θ o is a generalized obligation function. Proof. We prove that θ o satisfies the three conditions of the definition of a generalized obligation function.
Since o(S) ∈ ∆(S) for each S ⊂ N and o i (S) = 0 for each i ∈ S such that 0 ∈ S we conclude that m q=0 i∈Sq
3. Consider P, P ∈ P (N 0 ) such that P is finer than P and i ∈ N . Thus, θ o i (P ) = o i (S) where i ∈ S ∈ P . Since P is finer that P , there exists S ∈ P such that i ∈ S ⊂ S . Therefore,
If θ o is the generalized obligation function induced by the obligation function o, P ∈ P (N 0 ) and i ∈ S ∈ P then, θ o i only depends on S. Nevertheless if θ is a generalized obligation function, θ i depends on S but also on the rest of the agents (N 0 \ S) . Thus, we can think of obligation functions as the subset of generalized obligation functions where there are no externalities.
We say that f is a generalized obligation rule if there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that for each (N 0 , C) and i ∈ N ,
In this case we denote f = f θ and we say that f θ is the generalized obligation rule associated with the generalized obligation function θ. We now prove that the set of generalized obligation rules coincides with the set of rules associated with sharing functions.
θ is a generalized obligation function = {f : is a sharing function}
Proof. "⊃" Let f be such that is a sharing function. Let P = {S 0 , S 1 , ..., S m } ∈ P (N 0 ). There exists a sequence {P 0 , P 1, ..., P m } ⊂ P (N 0 ) such that P 0 = P, P m = {N 0 } , and for each q = 1, ..., m, P q−1 is 1-finer than P q . Note that this sequence may not be unique. We define
Since satisfies the path independence condition, θ (P ) does not depend on the sequence {P 0 , ..., P m } . Thus, θ (P ) is well defined.
We now prove that θ is a generalized obligation function.
1. Since i (P, P ) ≥ 0 for each P, P ∈ P (N 0 ) with P 1-finer than P and each i ∈ N, we deduce that θ i (P ) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N.
2.
3. Assume that P = {S 0 , ..., S m } is finer than P = {S 0 , ..., S m } . Then, m < m and there exists a sequence {P 0 , P 1, ..., P m } ⊂ P (N 0 ) such that P 0 = P, P m = {N 0 } , for each q = 1, ..., m, P q−1 is 1-finer than P q , and P m−m = P . Thus, given i ∈ N,
We have proved that θ is a generalized obligation function. We now prove that f θ = f . By 3 we have that if P is 1-finer than P and i ∈ N, then
Now it is trivial to see that f θ = f . " ⊂ " Let f θ be such that θ is a generalized obligation function. Given P, P ∈ P (N 0 ) where P is 1-finer than P , we define (P, P ) = θ (P ) − θ (P ) .
Next we prove that is a sharing function:
1. Assume that P is 1-finer than P . We prove that (P, P ) ∈ ∆ (N ) .
(a) Since P is finer than P and θ is a generalized obligation function, θ (P ) ≥ θ (P ). Hence,
2. We prove that satisfies the path independence condition. Assume that P 
Analogously, we can prove that
We have proved that is a sharing function. Now it is trivial to see that f θ = f .
We end this section by comparing generalized obligation rules with other sets of rules in the literature.
Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b) [4] [5] introduce optimistic weighted Shapley rules. They prove that these rules are obligation rules. Thus, they are also generalized obligation rules.
Moretti et al (2009) [19] introduce construct and charge (CC) rules. CC rules depend on a charge system specifying how to charge agents during the construction of a spanning tree. The charge systems must satisfy three properties: connection, involvement and total aggregation. By Theorem 1, generalized obligation functions can be interpreted in a similar way using the sharing functions. It is trivial to see that sharing functions satisfy total aggregation but fail connection and involvement. Thus, generalized obligation rules can be seen also as a generalization of construct and charge rules, when the order in which we construct the spanning tree is given by Kruskal's algorithm. If the spanning tree is constructed following a different order, then CC rules are, in general, different from generalized obligation rules. As a consequence both sets of rules are unrelated.
Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] prove that obligation rules are a subset of the set of marginalistic values of the irreducible form. In general, marginalistic values and generalized obligation rules are unrelated. There exist marginalistic values that are not generalized obligation rules. Let f be a marginalistic value satisfying that i∈N f i (N 0 , C) = m(N 0 , C) for some (N 0 , C). Thus, f cannot be a generalized obligation rule. Also, there exist generalized obligation rules that are not marginalistic values. Let θ be such that for any P, θ i (P ) = 0 when i = j. Thus, f 
The characterizations of obligation rules
Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] characterize the set of rules induced by sharing functions, and hence generalized obligation rules, as the set of rules satisfying restricted additivity and strong cost monotonicity. Adding some properties to the ones used in this result, we can obtain characterizations for the family of obligation rules and for the folk rule. We first consider two properties: core selection (the rule is in the core of the problem) and separability (if there are no savings when two groups of agents connect jointly, agents must pay the same when they connect jointly or separately). The main result of this section says that if we add core selection or separability to restricted additivity and strong cost monotonicity, we obtain two characterizations for obligation rules. If we add symmetry to both characterizations of obligation rules we characterize a single rule, the folk rule.
We introduce the properties used to characterize obligation rules.
Strong Cost Monotonicity ( SCM): for each pair of mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ) such that C ≤ C ,
This property implies that if some connection costs increase, no agent ends up better off. It appears, for instance, in Tijs et al (2006) [23] , Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] , and Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] .
Additivity is a standard property and it has been used in many situations. In the case of mcstp, additivity says that if we have two mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ), then f (N 0 , C + C ) = f (N 0 , C) + f (N 0 , C ). But the usual additivity property is incompatible with efficiency i∈N f i (N 0 , C) = m(N 0 , C) , so, no rule satisfies additivity. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2009) [8] introduce the restricted additivity property, which has been used later by Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] .
The mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ) are similar if there exists an mt t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N in (N 0 , C), (N 0 , C ), and (N 0 , C + C ) and an order π = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ Π N such that c i 0
≤ . . . ≤ c i 0 n in , i.e., the arcs in the mt t are ordered in the same way in both problems. Restricted Additivity (RA): for each pair of similar mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ),
From a mathematical point of view, RA is an appealing property because if a rule is additive the initial problem can be decomposed in a sum of simpler problems which are usually easier to solve. So, an additive rule is easier to compute. Besides, in many problems it is possible to characterize rules with additivity and very "basic" properties. For example, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b), one of the most important solutions for games with transferable utility, is characterized by means of additivity, efficiency, symmetry, and dummy player. There are many values satisfying efficiency, symmetry, and dummy player, for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 [22] ), but the Shapley value is the only one which satisfies additivity.
Moreover, given an mcstp (N 0 , C), assume that some additional costs that were not considered in the initial problem appear. Besides, assume that the mcstp associated with these extra costs is similar to (N 0 , C) . Then, RA says that the cost allocation provided by the rule should be the same if the problem is reevaluated considering these extra costs or if we sum up the initial allocation and the allocation of these extra costs.
Core Selection (CS): for each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each S ⊂ N ,
CS says that no coalition of agents has incentives to build their own mt. This is a standard property which has been used in many papers. For instance Bird (1976) [9] , Granot and Huberman (1981) [14] , Dutta and Kar (2004) [11] , and Faigle et al (1997) [12] .
Two subsets of agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect jointly. If there are no savings when they connect jointly, SEP says that agents must pay the same in both circumstances. This property appears in Megiddo (1978) [18] , Granot and Huberman (1981) [14] , and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] .
We now present the characterizations of obligation rules. [16] prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that obligation rules satisfy SCM and population monotonicity (P M ). Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove that population monotonicity implies CS.
Assume that f satisfies RA, SCM , and CS. We prove that there exists an obligation function o such that f = f o . By Theorem 1 in Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] , there exists a sharing function such that f (N 0 , C) = f (N 0 , C).
Given P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m } ∈ P (N 0 ), we define the mcstp (N 0 , C P ) where c P ij = 0 if i, j ∈ S k for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m} and c
By the proof of Theorem 1 in Bergantiños et al (2010) [3] , if P is 1-finer than P , then (P,
. By Theorem 1, there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f (N 0 , C) = f θ (N 0 , C). By the proof of Theorem 1, given P = {S 0 , ..., S m } ∈ P (N 0 ),
where P 0 = P and P m = {N 0 } . Thus,
Since f satisfies RA and SCM, f i N 0 , C {N0} = 0 for each i ∈ N. Thus, f = f θ where for each P ∈ P (N 0 ) and each i ∈ N , θ i (P ) = f i (N 0 , C P ). Given P ∈ P (N 0 ) with i ∈ S ∈ P , we define P S = {S, {j} j∈N0\S } ∈ P (N 0 ). Since P S is finer
Let us define the map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} the vector o(S) ∈ R S such that o i (S) = θ i (P S ) for each i ∈ S. We prove that o is an obligation function.
• o i (S) = θ i (P S ) ≥ 0 and
• Let i ∈ S ⊂ T . Clearly, P S is finer than P T . Therefore, θ i (P S ) ≥ θ i (P T ) and, hence,
We now prove that
Given a partition P ∈ P (N 0 ) remember that S(P, i) denotes the element of the partition P to which i belongs to. Thus,
(b) We know that obligation rules satisfy RA, SCM , and P M . Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove that P M implies SEP .
Consider an allocation rule f satisfying RA, SCM , and SEP . Using similar arguments to those used in (a), we can conclude that there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f = f θ .
Moreover, for each P ∈ P (N 0 ) , θ (P ) = f N 0 , C P .
Given P = {S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m }, it is easy to prove that m(N 0 , C
Using similar arguments to those used in (a), it can be proved that the map o assigning to each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} the vector o(S) = θ(P S ) is an obligation function and f = f o .
Let us introduce two properties which will be used later.
A rule f satisfies Population Monotonicity (P M ) if for each (N 0 , C), S ⊂ T ⊂ N, and i ∈ N , we have that
A rule f satisfies Cone-wise positive linearity (CP L) if for each (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C ) satisfying that there exists an order σ :
Remark 2. The properties used in Theorem 2 are independent. We will do the following: (i) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SCM but fails CS and SEP . Thus, CS is independent of RA and SCM in part (a). Moreover, SEP is independent of RA and SCM in part (b).
Let f be the egalitarian rule, i.e.,
It is trivial to see that f satisfies RA and SCM . Nevertheless, f does not satisfy SEP and CS. Let (N 0 , C) be such that N = {1, 2} and
(ii) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SEP but fails SCM . Thus, SCM is independent of RA and SEP in part (b).
Let u be a function assigning to each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} a vector u(S) ∈ R S satisfying the following conditions. For each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} such that 0 / ∈ S, i∈S u i (S) = 1. For each S ∈ 2 N0 \ {∅} such that 0 ∈ S, u i (S) = 0 for each i ∈ S. By convenience we take u i (∅) = 0 for each i ∈ N . We can associate with each function u a rule f u as in the case of an obligation rule f o associated with an obligation function o. Namely, given an mcstp (N 0 , C), let g |N | be a tree obtained applying Kruskal's algorithm to (N 0 , C). For each i ∈ N ,
Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that obligation rules are well defined. Using arguments similar to those used by them, we can prove that f u is well defined. Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. Using similar arguments to those used by them, we can prove that f u satisfies RA. Claim 1. f u satisfies SEP for each u. We avoid the proof. We now prove that f u does not satisfy SCM for some u. We first define u. Given S ⊂ N , Since C 4 ≤ C 8 we have that f u does not satisfy SCM .
(iii) We define a rule f which satisfies SCM , SEP , and CS but fails RA. Thus, RA is independent of SCM and CS in part (a). Moreover, RA is independent of SCM and SEP in part (b).
Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] prove that there exists a rule f which satisfies SCM and P M but fails CP L. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2009) [8] prove that if a rule satisfies RA, then the rule also satisfies CP L. Thus, f does not satisfy RA.
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove that P M implies SEP and CS. Thus, f also satisfies SEP and CS.
(iv) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and CS but fails SCM . Thus, SCM is independent of RA and CS in part (a).
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and an mt t, Bird (1976) [9] defined the minimal network (N 0 , C t ) associated with t as follows: c t ij = max (k,l)∈gij {c kl }, where g ij denotes the unique path in t from i to j. It is well known that the minimal network is independent of the mt t chosen. Thus, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] define the irreducible form (N 0 , C * ) of an mcstp (N 0 , C) as the minimal network (N 0 , C t ) associated with some mt t. We define a decomposition of C * in the conditions of Lemma 0. Let us clarify the decomposition in the next example. We define f in the following way:
where
Claim 2. f satisfies CS. We avoid the proof. Claim 3. f satisfies RA. We avoid the proof. f does not satisfy SCM . Let N = {1, 2, 3} and C be such that c ij = 0 for each i, j ∈ N and c 0i = 1 for each i ∈ N . Let C be such that c 23 = c 13 = 1 and c ij = c ij otherwise. C ≥ C but
Note that not all core allocations are obligation rules. Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] proved that the set of vectors of marginal contributions of the irreducible game v C * (see Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007b [7] ) is a subset of the family of obligation rules. Since the game v C * is concave, the core of this game coincides with the convex hull of the set of vectors of marginal contributions which coincides with the irreducible core of the original game v (see Bird 1976 [9] ). Thus, the irreducible core, which is a proper subset of the core, is a subset of the family of obligations rules. Moreover, the set of allocations induced by rules satisfying P M and SCM coincides with the set of allocations in the irreducible core. Since obligation rules satisfy both properties, they are contained in the irreducible core. Thus, an allocation is induced by an obligation rule if and only if it belongs to the irreducible core. So, there are allocations in the core that are not obligation rules. Besides, to study if an allocation is the outcome of an obligation rule, will be the same as to study if it belongs to the irreducible core and computing the irreducible core through the definition is an NP-hard problem because we have to compute the value of all coalitions and all vectors of marginal contributions.
Obligation rules have been characterized in Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] and Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] . Let us compare all these characterizations.
Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] characterize obligation rules with RA and P M . Thus, under RA, P M is a strong property. If a rule satisfies P M (and RA) it also satisfies SCM . This result is not true in general, there exist rules satisfying P M but failing SCM (see Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] ). Bergantiños and Kar (2010) [1] characterize obligation rules with SCM, P M, and CP L. In Theorem 2 we use CS or SEP instead of P M and RA instead of CP L. Thus, in order to obtain a tight characterization of obligation rules, if we weaken P M until CS or SEP, then we must strengthen CP L until RA. Analogously, if we weaken RA until CP L in our results, then we must strengthen CS or SEP until P M .
Feltkamp et al (1994) [13] introduce the folk rule in mcstp, which has been studied later in Branzei et al (2004) [10] and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a , 2007b [6] [7] [8] . Given a mcstp (N 0 , C) Tijs et al (2006) prove that the folk rule is the obligation rule f o where for each S ∈ N 0 and each i ∈ S the obligation function o is defined as follows:
As a corollary of Theorem 2 we can give two new axiomatic characterizations of this rule. In order to do so, we need to introduce the property of symmetry.
We say that i, j ∈ N are symmetric if for each k ∈ N 0 \ {i, j}, c ik = c jk . We say that f satisfies Symmetry (SY M ) if for each mcstp (N 0 , C) and each pair of symmetric agents i, j ∈ N , f i (N 0 , C) = f j (N 0 , C). Proof. (a) We first prove that the folk rule satisfies these properties. By Theorem 2.(a), the folk rule satisfies RA, SCM , and CS. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove that the folk rule satisfies SY M .
We now prove the uniqueness. Let f be a rule satisfying the four properties. By the proof of Theorem 2. This finishes the proof of (a). The proof of (b) is similar and we omit it.
The properties used in these characterizations of the folk rule are not independent.
